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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

STATUTORY

REQUIREMENT OF INJURY BY ACCIDENT
The Supreme Court of Mississippi in a 1958 case has
affirmed the action of the State Workmen's Compensation
Commission in an award where claimant's disability was the
result of mental and physical strain incident to her work and
aggravating a pre-existing hypertensive condition culminating
in her disability due to a cerebral thrombosis. Claimant was
employed in a supervisory position with the Insurance Department of Mississippi and had just finished the busiest three
months of her working year when her stroke occurred'.
The Mississippi court found that medical testimony was
sufficient to develop a casual relation between the claimant's
employment and cerebral thrombosis. According to the majority of the court:
The issue as a matter of medical causation is the
ability of the particular work activities or strains to
affect the particular diseased vascular system. The
direct medical question is whether, given this employee's pathology and the exertions of the job, the
exertions in fact contributed to the collapse 2 .
In effect, the majority of the court did not consider the
statutory limitation of an accidental injury as controlling, and
affirmed the award without discussing the point. In doing so,
Mississippi has clearly endorsed the theory that a workman's
normal duties when coupled with a pre-existing infirmity can
constitute grounds for relief under the Mississippi Workmen's
Compensation Law.
The Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act requires "personal injury by accident" and the accident must "arise out of
and in the course of employment 3 ." It is not necessary that the
1 Insurance Dept. of Miss. et. al. v. R. R. Dinsmore, Adm'r., Estate of Mrs.
Alice Dinsmore, Deceased, 104 So.2d 296 (1958).
2 Id. at 298.
3

Va. Code, § 65-7 (1950).
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employee be engaged in activity which is unusual if the resulting injury is a sudden structural change in the body4 . The
Virginia court, on the other hand, has denied compensation
where the injury is gradual in nature and the employee has
not engaged in work which was abnormal in terms of his
regularly assigned duties'.
In accordance with the great majority of jurisdictions, a
pre-existing disease is not a bar to compensation when the
injury partakes of the nature of an accident 6 . However compensation has been denied when a pre-existing disease and
normal duties have combined to produce a cerebral hemorrhage7 . The Virginia rule, therefore, requires that the cause
of the injury or the resulting consequences must be capable
of classification as an accident and the Supreme Court of Appeals has not extended the concept beyond these limitations.
The great majority of Workmen's Compensation statutes
restrict compensation to those injuries which are accidental
in nature8 . The judicial interpretation of this statutory requirement has been an extremely broad one, and a number of
cases have denied that "accidental" has any precise significance
when applied to Workmen's Compensation cases'. Generally,
"accidental" is interpreted in accordance with the spirit and
purpose of the acts, and several opinions do not hesitate to
4

Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Quann, 197 Va. 9, 87 S.E.2d 624 (1955);
Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 49 S.E.2d 417 (1948); Big Jack
Overall Co. v. Bray, 161 Va. 446, 171 S.E. 686 (1933).

5 Aistrop v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 181 Va. 287, 24 S.E.2d 546 (1943).
6 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Money, 174 Va. 50, 4 S.E.2d 739 (1939).
7

Rust Engineering Co. v. Ramsey, 194 Va. 975, 76 S.E.2d 195 (1953).

8

Statutory requirements of accidental injury may take any number of forms.
A summary of the phraseology used in stating the requirement may be
found in 1 Larson, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, 511 (1952).

9Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 178 Va. 625, 16 S.E.2d 646 (1941);
Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6 Ill.2d 296, 128 N.E.2d
718 (1955); Rivard v. J. F. McElwain Co., 95 N.H. 100, 58 A.2d 501
(1948).

indicate that requirements of "accidental injury" should not
result in defeating the workman's claim'".
The requirement of accidental injury does, however, impose some limitations and the courts do not agree as to
exactly what types of claims should be excluded as non-accidental. A consideration of the amount and type of exertion
engaged in by the employee and the nature of the injury are
helpful in analyzing the cases in this respect".
An employee who has not exceeded the normal exertions
of his regular job and who suffers a rather localized injury,
such as a hernia or a rupture, is generally held to have received
an injury by accident. In these cases the resulting injury is
"unforeseen" and "sudden" and a majority of courts state that
the requirements of an accident are present 2 . On the other
hand, the decisions are not so apt to find an accident when
normal exertion causes a more generalized result such as a
coronary thrombosis or a muscle strain. Here, the courts are
hard pressed to find a sudden or violent event in either cause
or result, and many deny compensation .
In this latter group of cases the claimant is often suffering
from a pre-existing disease which is also a causal factor in his
ultimate injury. The pre-existing disease which is accelerated
by employment conditions is generally held to be no bar to
recovery and is practically uniformly held to meet the "arising
10

we early warned against too literal an interpretation of the elements
of the definition of an accident. The purpose of these warnings to avoid
a strained and technical meaning which would defeat the obvious intent
and purpose of the act, namely, the industry should bear the expense
of injuries to workmen occasioned by the employment." Winkelman v.
Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P.2d 171 at 173 (1949). Hardin's
Bakeries v. Ranager, 217 Miss. 463, 64 So.2d 705 (1953).

". ..

11 Larson, op. cit. supra note 8, at 512.
12

Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790 (1942); Rathbun v.
Taber Tank Lines, 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955).

13 Hillerich & Bradley Co. v. Parker, -Ky.-,

267 S.W.2d 746 (1954);
Carlson v. Batts, 69 Idaho 456, 207 P.2d 1023 (1949); Smith v. Gen.
Motors Corp., Fisher Body, St. Louis Div., Mo., 189 S.W.2d 259 (1945);
Nelson v. Industrial Comm., 150 Ohio St. 1, 80 N.E.2d 430 (1948).

out of" employment criterion'". Those cases which deny recovery when the injury itself is not sufficiently fortuitous to
qualify as an accident are not, as a general rule, denying compensation due to the existence of pre-existing disease but are
denying compensation because they can find no accident 15 .
Without an accident, the disease itself, as aggravated by the
normal working conditions of the employee's employment, is
the cause of claimant's disability, and the Workmen's Compensation Acts are not designed to compensate for risks which
are personal to the employee.
The question then is: does the acceleration of a pre-existing
disease by the normal duties of the employee constitute an
accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Statutes?
In those jurisdictions which answer this question in the
affirmative, the only question is one of medical and not legal
causation 16 . Conversely those courts, which do not accept
normal duties plus a pre-existing disease as an accident, find
it necessary, in order to justify compensation, to answer one
of the two following questions in the affirmative:
1) Did the employee exceed his normal exertion pattern
prior to the injury"?
2) Is the injury, itself, such that it partakes of the nature
of an accident'"?
14Michel v. Maryland Casualty Co., -La.App.-,

81 So.2d 36 (1955);
Special Indemnity Fund v. McFee, 200 Okla. 288, 193 P.2d 301 (1948).

153Baker v. Slaughter, 220 Ark. 325, 248 S.W.2d 106 (1952);
B. F. Shaw Co., 224 S.C. 89, 77 S.E.2d 491 (1953).

Price v.

16 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 73 Cal.App.2d 555,
169 P.2d 908 (1946); Finch v. Evins Amusement Co., 80 Ga.App. 457,
56 S.E.2d 489 (1949).
17Brown v. Minneapolis Board of Fire Underwriters, 210 Minn. 529, 299
N.W.14 (1941); Hanzlik v. Interstate Power Co., 67 S.D. 128, 298
N.W. 589 (1940).
18 See note 7 supra.
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It is submitted that the Mississippi decision represents a
trend in Workmen's Compensation litigation which extends
coverage beyond the statutory language in order to keep pace
with modern theories on the function and purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Acts. As the statutory language
becomes less important, the courts are forced to depend upon
vague considerations of public policy in the field. If "injury
by accident" is not to limit the award of Workmen's Compensation, the legislature is the proper tribunal to delete the
phrase from the statute.
T. D. T.

